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Abstract
This paper presents a simple PIN-like approach to user
authentication, using the gaze sequence of an observer
when presented with a previously-seen image on a personal
computer screen. The method relies on the principle that
the human visual system requires the eye to rest motionless
for short periods, to assimilate detail at a given location in
a visual scene. By deliberately looking at certain features
or objects in a scene following a pre-defined sequence spec-
ified by the observer, an independent signature for personal
identification can be established. Points of gaze fixation can
be identified using a simple eye-tracker based on images
from a typical webcam, and processed to extract a compact
representation of the significant screen locations from the
gaze sequence. Experimental results demonstrate that these
“signatures” can be reliably and rapidly computed, and of-
fer the advantage that they are difficult to detect by covert
means.
Keywords: biometrics, gaze, eye movement, visual atten-
tion, personal identification, user authentication, computer
security.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, activities and transactions of a personal na-
ture are being undertaken using personal computers, bring-
ing greater need for access security and user authentica-
tion. Use of various physical human-based biometric per-
sonal identification techniques (e.g. fingerprints) has be-
come widespread, to complement those which can be ap-
plied remotely from the individual (e.g. passwords) and so
can be easily stolen and reproduced fraudulently [4]. These
physical biometrics usually require some form of special
peripheral device to read them, not yet available as standard
equipment on personal computers, and subject also to possi-
ble attack by detection of the signals they produce. It is thus
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desirable to have a biometric which does not rely on direct
physical contact between the human and the machine: the
gaze-based approach described here satisfies that require-
ment. This paper will first provide some background on as-
pects of the human visual system associated with gaze, and
will then describe a general approach to make use of gaze
patterns for construction of PIN-like personal identification
gaze signatures. Results of experiments to establish the fea-
sibility of this approach will be presented, followed by some
recommendations concerning its general applicability.
2. Eye Movement and Gaze Behaviour
It is well known that when a human subject views a vi-
sual scene, assimilation of the contents is built up by a suc-
cession of fixations with the eye held virtually motionless
at a fixed location for a duration of typically a few hun-
dred milliseconds, allowing localized detail of the scene to
be gathered through the retina preferentially in the vicin-
ity of the foveal zone [2, 5]. A fixation period is followed
by the smooth and rapid saccadic movement of the eye to
a new fixation location, where the fixation process is re-
peated. The brain builds up an overall impression of the
scene by combining detailed information from the sequence
of fixations, with some infill from the visual periphery. The
vicinity of previous fixation locations may be revisited un-
systematically after the first few seconds of viewing, and
typically of the order of 10 different fixation locations will
provide as much information as the brain seeks, even for
relatively complex scenes.
While the sequence of fixation locations is determined
subconsciously by a viewer in an unconstrained viewing sit-
uation, it is also possible for the viewer to consciously di-
rect his or her fixations towards prescribed locations and for
prescribed durations, within fairly broad performance toler-
ance limits. It is this form of directed fixation or “gaze”
behaviour which the approach described below exploits to
provide a biometric means of user authentication.
3. User Authentication using Gaze Sequences
The proposed biometric mimics the activity of entering
a PIN on a keypad or touchpad: namely a sequence of con-
strained actions selecting specific locations or symbols over
a short period of time. Several objects or features in the
image which serve as natural points of interest would be
identified as the symbol set, and the viewer would follow
a specified or selected sequence of gazing at these points
for a prescribed approximate time period to denote the cor-
responding PIN. Provided the localization of the gaze po-
sitions was sufficiently accurate to correctly determine the
symbol, and the sensitivity to duration was sufficient to de-
termine that a gaze was intended to select a symbol, the
approaches map directly to each other. If the variety of pos-
sible gaze positions is similar to the variety of symbols in
a PIN, and the overall duration of a gaze was similar to the
duration of a keypress, there should be no major workflow
advantage of one approach over the other. Typical PIN sym-
bol sets have 10 or more numeric elements, of which users
typically choose 4 to 8 to constitute a suitable PIN.
Previous work [3] has identified constraints and assump-
tions on the properties of gaze tracking of which the follow-
ing are relevant to the intended user authentication task:
1. The operating characteristics of the tracking device
need to be sufficient to allow the necessary detail in
spatial and temporal resolution. A sampling rate of
approximately 50ms or less will achieve the temporal
requirement generally. Spatial localization to around
30% of the overall scene linear dimensions is sufficient
to establish fixation points appropriate to this applica-
tion. These performance characteristics are generally
within reach of a simple infrared camera based tracker.
2. A sufficient number of successive gaze points is re-
quired to allow unique characterization of an individ-
ual within the population, and to override the effect
of involuntary errors in gaze location and sequence,
without requiring too many points or too long a gaze
duration for practical purposes. A reasonable maxi-
mum time for PIN entry appears to be approximately
10 seconds, after which some fatigue/boredom effects
typically occur.
3.1. Gaze-Tracking Device
The device used to record eye movements during the fol-
lowing experiments was an EyeTech video-based corneal
reflection eye tracker. This device is normally used for
point-of-regard measurements, i.e. those that measure the
position of the eye relative to 3D space rather than relative
to the head [6]. The method of operation relies on tracking
the corneal reflection from an infra-red light source, as it is
invisible to the human eye and non-distracting. Although
four separate reflections are formed during the reflection of
a light source, referred to as Purkinje reflections [1], only
the first Purkinje reflection is utilized in the video-based
tracker and is located relative to the location of the pupil
center using image processing techniques.
The gaze-tracker utilized operated in a default setting of
15 frames per second, resulting in a sample of the observer’s
gaze direction approximately every 67ms. The experiments
were conducted using an image and screen resolution of
1024  768 pixels.
(a)
Figure 1. Prague image used in the gaze-
tracking experiments with a non-uniform 3x3
grid superimposed on the image.
4. Performance Measurements and Results
Following the above principles, an experimental investi-
gation was conducted to establish the accuracy, reliability,
efficiency and useability of the proposed user authentica-
tion method. An image of the city of Prague (see Figure
1) was selected as a reasonably complex yet recognizably
natural scene, for which viewers should have little difficulty
selecting several distinctive and well separated gaze points.
A grid of 3 horizontal cells and 3 vertical cells was also su-
perimposed on the image and is shown in the figure. The
individual cells in this 3  3 grid, (a total of 9 cells in all),
are encoded with the numbers 1..9 from left to right and top
to bottom, analogous to a telephone keypad. This grid can
also be customized to suit the image being viewed. In this
case, the grid was made marginally non-uniform in order to
separate some of the detail in the center of the image more
effectively, as seen in Figure 1.
Ten viewers were used in this experiment and all viewers
were instructed to look at six specific points of interest in the
Prague image. As only a small number of people were uti-
lized, the same six points were used in each case, however,
the viewing sequence was re-arranged for each person. This
essentially provided a unique PIN sequence which could be
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Figure 2. (a) Example of gaze data, (b) Plot of extracted fixations.
used to distinguish very clearly between the different indi-
viduals. The viewers were instructed to follow their respec-
tive sequence of points with their eye movements, and to
hold their gaze for an estimated duration of approximately
1 second at each location.
Each of these six points are contained in a different cell
in the 3   3 grid. As the eye movements of the viewer
were recorded during this process, the gaze data was passed
through a clustering algorithm to extract fixations with a
time constraint or threshold imposed on the fixation dura-
tion,
 
. All fixations with a duration equal to or larger
than this threshold were extracted and encoded according to
the cell in the 3  3 grid it was contained in. The experiment
was repeated for the ten different viewers on 3 different oc-
casions separated by several minutes so as to simulate PIN
entry on separate user authentication occasions.
For this overt approach to developing a biometric mea-
sure, the system may be considered to have two operat-
ing modes. The first mode consists of the off-line training
wherein the library of PIN sequences is compiled for each
individual. The second mode is the actual online operation
of the authentication system. In this mode, an observer’s
gaze data is first recorded online, then the PIN sequence is
extracted by processing the gaze data, and compared against
the database of PIN sequences to identify or authenticate an
individual.
For each of the ten viewers, the viewing of the six points
of interest in the Prague image will result in a six PIN se-
quence that is unique for that individual. These sequences
are recorded and stored in the database during offline train-
ing and are shown below as a sequence of six numbers in
Table 1.
Person PIN Person PIN
P1 962375 P6 792356
P2 672359 P7 963752
P3 327965 P8 293657
P4 523796 P9 572369
P5 257369 P10 736952
Table 1. PIN sequences for the ten observers.
For the given Prague image, the observer was directed
to gaze at each of the six specific points for approximately
one second each and in their prescribed sequence. The gaze
data (sampled at 15fps, or once every 0.067 secs) was then
passed through a spatial clustering algorithm to extract any
fixations with a duration equal to or larger than the fixation
threshold  . The threshold used for this first experiment
was 

secs, i.e. 10 gaze samples. These fixations were
then encoded as a PIN sequence according to which cell in
the 3  3 grid the fixation was located in, and were finally
compared against the database to authenticate the individ-
ual. Using the threshold   = 0.67 secs, this experiment
resulted in 100% authentication for all individuals. Thus,
the extracted PIN sequences from the 3 repeat scans of all
ten viewers exactly matched their respective PIN sequences
stored in the database given by Table 1.
This first experiment resulted in a successful authentica-
tion in all cases. Figure 2 (a) shows some example gaze data
recorded during one of these experiments. After clustering
these original gaze samples with a constraint on the time
of fixation, only six fixations were obtained and are plotted
against the Prague image in Figure 2 (b). These fixations
correspond to the six points the observer was directed to ex-
amine. Similar fixation plots were also obtained across the
three repeat experiments from all viewers.
To test the robustness of this authentication system, the
above experiment was repeated with three different values
of the fixation threshold:    		 secs, 
 secs and



 secs. The results of this are summarized in Table 2
for the first 3 viewers only. The table shows the extracted
PIN sequences for these thresholds. The large majority of
these PIN sequences are incorrect. Scans labeled with ’ are
sequences with an extra PIN number in the sequence. Scans
labeled with  are sequences with one or more PIN numbers
missing from the sequence. Either case would result in an
unsuccessful authentication.
To determine the optimum threshold value for the fixa-
tion duration, plots of the recognition rate verses the thresh-
old value in seconds were generated and are shown in Fig-
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Figure 3. Recognition Rates plotted against the fixation threshold   for Scans 1, 2, and 3 of the 10
viewers respectively.
Person   Scan 1 Scan 2 Scan 3
0.33s 5962375’ 962375 962375
P1 1.00s 962375 96275

962375
1.20s 625

625

965

0.33s 672359 672359 672359
P2 1.00s 67359

672359 67359

1.20s 6359 67359 67359
0.33s 3247965’ 5327965’ 327965
P3 1.00s 37965

32765

2965

1.20s 795 32765 295
Table 2. Table showing extracted PIN se-
quences for three threshold values.
ure 3. This figure shows the recognition rates for the three
repeat experiments for each of the ten viewers. The recog-
nition rate is a measure of the recognition accuracy and is
computed as
  
 


	 
 (1)
where 

is a count of the number of correct pins recorded
in the correct order,  is the number of incorrect pins
in the sequence, and 	 is the total number of pins in the
correct sequence, (which is six in these experiments). As
can be seen from Figure 3, there is a global optimum for
the fixation threshold. Values too low result in the genera-
tion of extra incorrect PINs in the sequence and hamper the
recognition rate while values too high result in the loss of
PINs being extracted and also degrade the recognition rate.
The optimum value was found to be approximately around
  


secs for this experiment.
5. Conclusion
A simple biometric based on a gaze sequence on a per-
sonal computer screen has been described. The experiments
reported above have validated the acceptable performance
of the approach and demonstrated that it is comparable with
conventional PIN based user authentication. It would be de-
sirable to extend these results by testing a larger pool of sub-
jects, images and PINs, which would allow stricter perfor-
mance envelopes to be derived. For example, implementing
a 4  4 grid rather than 3  3 would almost double the ef-
fective uniqueness of PIN choices, provided the eye tracker
is accurate enough.
This work has been based around an image as the defin-
ing source of PIN symbols, but this need not be so: a
blank screen with the superimposed grid would provide the
same environment. However, the entry of a PIN would be
conducted under more comfortable conditions and may be
harder to observe covertly, when the pictorial background
is used. It should also be easier for the viewer to remember
a sequence of objects or features in a scene rather than a
sequence of grid cell numbers, relying on the innate spatial
characteristics of our visual memory system.
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